

Fundamentalism Reconsidered

Jonathan Sacks

The Archbishop of Canterbury is the latest to fall into the trap of misdefining "fundamentalism". By grouping together "Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East, Christian fundamentalism in Ulster and Jewish fundamentalism in Israel," Dr. Runcie in his address to the Anglican General Synod was linking together like with unlike. Jewish fundamentalism in Israel indeed reflects a "fundamental belief" of Judaism in asserting a historical/Biblical claim to particular territory.

As an editorial in *The Times* pointed out, journalists are often guilty of bandying about fashionable words without considering their precise meaning, but this ought to be a lesser hazard for prelates.

In the present timely article Jonathan Sacks analyses Biblical interpretations that have been branded "fundamentalist" and considers in particular where the non-Orthodox Jewish movements err in their definition.

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'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.'¹

Lewis Carroll's remark is uncannily appropriate to the rhetoric of current religious argument. The key Humpty Dumpty word in contemporary discourse is the term 'fundamentalism'. It is used with passion. But no one quite knows what it means.

Is it, as James Barr suggests,² a term relating to Conservative Evangelical Christianity, or does it apply to Catholicism as well? It has been applied, in the last decade, to Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and Jews. But if Fundamentalism refers to the holding of certain doctrinal positions, then certainly there is no doctrinal common ground between these faiths.

Sometimes it is used to refer to a certain attitude to sacred texts, but again without any strict consistency. It may mean one who regards those texts as Divinely revealed, or literally true, or inerrant, or authoritative, or immutable, or invested with unimpeachable sanctity. Clearly these views are very different from one another.

Others use it to refer to a range of religious and cognitive attitudes. According to Barr these include personal pietism, a reluctance to create denominations and religious establishments, a distaste for the professional ministry, a preference for informality and a refusal to give a hearing to other points of view. Only some of these — perhaps only the last — will strike a chord with those who use the word in a Jewish or an Islamic context.

Yet others again use it in the context of political activism. Fundamentalism here refers to the very different politics engaged in by the so-called Moral Majority in the United States and by radical conservatives like the late Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. The word has been used to describe the reaction of the Islamic community to Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses*. When used in the context of Israel, it is most often ascribed to the territorially maximalist group Gush Emunim.

For some, Fundamentalism is an attitude to society, culture and modernity. In this sense it is certainly a reaction *against* modernity and an attempt to restate classic or traditional religious values. But the object of criticism certainly differs between faiths. In Christianity it seems to be secularisation; in Islam, westernisation; and in Judaism, assimilation.

One result is that when the word is used in a Jewish context it is sometimes taken to refer to all Orthodox Jews, on the ground that Orthodoxy involves a belief that the Torah is the word of God and not — even partially — the work of man. Such a belief, Conservative and liberal theologians argue, is incompatible with modern historical scholarship and therefore fundamentalist.

At other times it is used to refer to those who understand the Torah literally; or to those who argue that all halakhic change is impermissible; or to those who invest the words of great Torah sages with absolute authority; or to those who see no value in secular culture — four very different sub-groups within Orthodoxy. As one writer has noted, 'Any position . . . that is more traditionalist, or closer to the halakhah, than that of the person using the term is potentially "fundamentalist"'. Hence 'the label "fundamentalist" finds itself pinned on to a range of groups and individuals who may in practice have little or nothing in common with one another.'³

Finally, as we noted, it is predicated of the disciples of the late R. Zvi Yehudah Kook — the religious members of Gush Emunim — who lay great stress on the sanctity and settlement of *Eretz Yisrael shelemah*, the land of Israel in its broadest boundaries. Here it has nothing to do with religious belief as such, but to a particular relationship between belief and political action.

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Nor is this all. The emotive or evaluative charge of the word has shifted significantly over time. Barr attributes the origin of the term to the series of booklets published in America between 1910 and 1915 called *The Fundamentals*. They set out with uncompromising rigour the fundamentals of Christian faith. Shortly thereafter, those who held firmly to Christian dogma in the face of the then current strands in Biblical study came to be known as fundamentalists. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* dates the word's first appearance at 1923. Originally, then, it was a term of praise.

More recently, though, it has become a term of abuse, 'suggesting narrowness, bigotry, obscurantism and sectarianism.' More recently still there has been a counter-attack by traditionalists. Thus one Orthodox rabbi could write, some weeks ago, 'The Rambam, the

Vilna Gaon, the Chassam Sofer and all other *gedolim* were fundamentalists who respected and understood the scientific knowledge of the time.' There is an attempt here to reclaim the positive association of the word.

A word used with such constantly changing connotations is in danger of losing all sense and reference. It means just what the speaker chooses it to mean, no more and no less. There is a need for some ground-clearing to be done if invective is to be elevated to the level of argument.

The subject is large, and in what follows I have addressed only a part of a part of it: Fundamentalism as a way of reading the Biblical text. In what sense can Orthodoxy as such be said to be fundamentalist? In what sense does that term apply only to particular schools of thought within Orthodoxy? And in what sense does it not apply to Judaism at all?

Throughout, I would ask the reader to divest the word of negative associations. If Judaism commands us to be fundamentalists, let us be so, proudly and undefensively. But let us be so, also, precisely and accurately. *Kiddush* and *havdalah* are linked commands: for there is no sanctification without the making of clear distinctions.

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Orthodoxy involves belief in a proposition denied by most non-Orthodox Jews, namely, that the Five Books of Moses are the unmediated word of God. They are, that is to say, *revelation*. It is in this sense that Conservative Jews often speak of Orthodoxy as a whole as fundamentalist.

Here, for example, is one recent Conservative account of the distinction between 'fundamentalist' and 'historical' approaches to the Bible. The 'fundamentalist view . . . held by many Orthodox Jews, some Protestant Christians and almost all Moslems . . . contends that the whole Pentateuch was given by God to Moses at Sinai.' The 'historical view . . . held by the great majority of the Conservative and Reform movements in contemporary America, much of Christendom and most Biblical scholars . . . is that the Bible consists of a number of texts, composed by a variety of people in a number of places and times and later compiled in written form by a redactor.'⁴

The belief in Torah as revelation is not simply a fundamental of Jewish faith. It is *the* fundamental. For were it not for our faith in Torah, how could we arrive at religious certainty about the creation of the world, the meaningfulness of human existence, the justice of history and the promise of messianic redemption? Our knowledge of these things, fragmentary though it is, is derived neither from logic nor science but from our faith in Torah and its Divine authorship. In this sense, therefore, Orthodoxy is fundamentalist.

It is strange, though, that the word should be used in this sense, as if to suggest that belief in revelation were obscurantist or 'unscholarly'. The phrase 'And God spoke' is full of mystery. But no more so than the phrase 'And God did'. The mystery in both cases lies at the point of contact between the Infinite and the finite, the metaphysical and the empirical.

The beliefs in creation, miracle, Divine providence, reward and punishment and redemption all share this same feature with revelation, that they involve attributing an event to the authorship of God. They do not rule out the possibility that an empiricist — one who refused to admit the idea of a metaphysical cause — might interpret those events differently. There are

no religious events that are self-authenticating; none that can be interpreted *in only one way*. As the Torah's description of Pharaoh's reaction to the plagues makes clear: a miracle can always be interpreted as magic. Religious belief, that is to say, always requires faith. But faith is not a denial of the evidence of the senses. It is a trust in something beyond the senses. There was something beyond the mighty east wind that parted the waters at the Red Sea. There was something beyond the human hand that first inscribed the words of the Mosaic books. That something in both cases was God.

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To believe in revelation, therefore, requires faith. What is perplexing, though, is the Conservative argument that there can be Jewish faith *without* belief in revelation. For, broadly speaking, there are two kinds of 'non-fundamentalist' approaches to the Torah. There is the empiricist-historicist view that the Torah is to be seen as an altogether human work, to be understood within the categories of secular history. And there is the Conservative position that the Torah is not revelation but *inspiration*, the word of God *as interpreted by man*. This would give the Five Books of Moses roughly the same status accorded by the sages to the non-Mosaic books. The first view is consistent. It dispenses with religious faith altogether in reading sacred texts. The second view, though, is not yet a view at all until we have some criterion for distinguishing between the Divine and human elements in the text.

Some Conservatives, for example, have argued that the law of *mamzerut* (illegitimacy), which they see as morally offensive, must therefore be the work of man. Some liberals have said the same about the Biblical prohibition of homosexuality. But this is an extraordinary view of man. On what conceivable ground can we assume, *a priori*, that man can have only offensive ideas? Why not inspiring ones also? If so, then all items of Jewish faith — the covenant, the promise, the hope — are possibly human constructs also; and we have no way of knowing which are not. If so, Jewish faith as a totality has no more objective reality than the religious imagination of a small group of dreamers long ago and far away.

The Conservative position is given spurious credibility by two separate confusions. First is the assumption that it is supported by secular Biblical scholarship of the last two hundred years. It is not. That scholarship assumes at the outset that texts are to be understood independently of Divine revelation or inspiration. It therefore supplies no support to, or refutation of, any particular metaphysical view of the way God speaks to man. Second is the assumption that since Judaism contains a view of inspiration (to the other prophets) and revelation (to Moses), the former idea is coherent without the latter. Again, it is not. As Maimonides makes clear, our belief in prophecy is dependent on the laws laid down in the Torah itself.⁵ Without revelation, in other words, we would not believe in inspiration.

A further factor in making Conservatism seem coherent is its apparent similarity to 'conservative' positions within Christianity, ones that admit historical criticism of sacred scriptures. Again the comparison is misleading. For this kind of Christian theology takes *another* kind of revelation to be central: the revelation of God in human form. Once theology is built on that foundation, it can take a critical view

of scripture. For scripture is not then revelation itself, but the record of that revelation by witnesses to it. For Judaism, revelation does not refer to the person or presence of God but to the word of God. A view, therefore, that can be made intelligible within Christianity cannot be transferred to Judaism and assumed to be intelligible there also.

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The second sense in which the term fundamentalist is used is to describe a particular approach to Biblical authority. As Barr puts it: 'For fundamentalists the Bible is more than the source of verity for their religion, more than the essential source or textbook. It is . . . practically the centre of the religion,' he suggests, 'because it is the accessible and articulate reality, available empirically for checking and verification, that provide the lines that run through the religion and determine its shape and character.'⁶

Now in such a sense, fundamentalism is well known to Jewish history as the heresy known as Karaism. It is what Yeshayahu Leibowitz picturesquely describes as 'bibliolatry'. The Pharasiac and rabbinic tradition are precisely built on the rejection of idea that we can derive instruction directly from the Biblical text. In addition to the written law, there is an oral law, the latter being the authoritative explication of the former. Maimonides includes rejection of the oral law as 'denial of the Torah'.⁷ In this sense, Fundamentalism is a negation of Orthodoxy.

It is this, above all, that makes Fundamentalism a phenomenon of Protestant Christianity with no equivalent in Judaism. For Judaism insists, first, that the Biblical text requires *interpretation*; second, that that interpretation is provided by *tradition*, which has the same authority as revelation itself; third, that to be applied to the present, that tradition must itself be interpreted by *authoritative exponents* of Torah, whether in the form of a Sanhedrin, or a recognised court of Jewish law, or an acknowledged *posek*, halakhic authority.

Interestingly, in one way, it is precisely the liberal forms of Judaism that come closest, in contemporary Jewish life, to the Protestant fundamentalist model. For it is they that argue that the traditional understanding of Torah, concretised in halakhic precedent, can be overturned in the name of personal autonomy, or 'fresh ethical insights'. They, like Protestant Fundamentalism, represent a reaction against the authority of community, tradition, precedent and established practice. They argue that such things have, over the course of time, distorted the essential teachings of religion, and that piety demands a fresh encounter with the texts, untrammelled by the history of the way those texts have been understood by the community of faith. That is not to say that liberal forms of Judaism are fundamentalist. It is to say that they are 'protestantisations' of Judaism.

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The third aspect of what is called a fundamentalist approach to the Bible is the belief in its *inerrancy*. The Torah is true and free of error. In this sense, certainly we believe that the Torah is 'a law of truth'. But of what kind of truth do we speak?

Do we speak of *literal* truth? On this point, within Judaism itself there were forceful arguments as to the empirical content of Biblical propositions. The dominant strand of early rabbinical thought ruled out any naive literalism in reading the Biblical text: and this as

a matter of principle. For the Torah uses a whole series of physical and emotional attributes in speaking of God. These anthropomorphisms offended against rabbinic ideas of the incorporeality of God. Writing these implications out of the text was a major element of some of the *targumim* or early rabbinic translations, and constitutes a large part of Maimonides' philosophical programme in the *Guide of the Perplexed*.

Indeed Maimonides ruled that to attribute physical characteristics to God was a form of heresy,⁸ and added: 'You will perhaps say that the literal interpretation of the Bible causes men to fall into that doubt, but you must know that idolaters were likewise brought to their belief by false imaginations and ideas.'⁹ The fact, in other words, that one might believe that God had physical attributes because one read the Torah literally was no excuse.

There remained such questions as whether, for example, Jacob's wrestling match with the angel, or Balaam's talking donkey, or Jonah's sojourn in the belly of a whale, were to be understood literally as taking place in physical space, or as dreams or prophetic visions, to be understood as metaphors or allegories or mystic intimations. On such questions, for example, Maimonides and Nachmanides in the Middle Ages took different approaches.¹⁰ Nonetheless, three medieval philosophers of such different intellectual orientations as Saadia Gaon, Judah Halevi and Maimonides could agree that if a scriptural verse conflicted with the dictates of reason, it was to be interpreted other than literally. Maimonides explains *why* the Torah uses figurative language: so that each will understand the Torah's truths at a level appropriate to his or her understanding, some literally, some metaphorically.¹¹

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This much, though, is generally conceded by critics of Orthodoxy. What makes one a fundamentalist, they argue, is not an insistence on the *literal* truth of the Torah but on its truth *per se*. But it is here that liberal Jewish theologians, impressed by Barr's strictures against Protestant Fundamentalism, fall into an error which Barr himself is careful to avoid. For clearly, anyone who turns to the Bible for guidance in belief and conduct takes it as true *in some sense*. This applies to fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists alike. Critics of Fundamentalism must therefore maintain that it ascribes the *wrong sort* of truth to the Bible. Which sense is that?

Barr is clear. The 'sort of truth that is important for the fundamentalist' is, he says, 'correspondence to external reality.' A fundamentalist is one who reads the Bible for *factual information*. That, for him, is its purpose as a book. 'Veracity as correspondence with empirical actuality has precedence over veracity as significance.'¹² Or again: 'correspondence with external reality must be affirmed as an inalienable and essential property of the Biblical texts.'¹³ Or again: 'the fundamentalist conception of truth is dominated by a materialistic view, derived from a scientific age.'¹⁴

Now there are certainly those who read the Torah this way. But equally, there are those who do not. When the sages ask, 'Why was this book written?' or 'Why was this passage placed next to that?' rarely indeed do they answer: because that is how things happened. Their normal mode of answer begins with the words, 'To teach you that . . .' The sages were concerned, that is to say, with Torah as *instruction*, legal and ethical. Indeed that is what the word Torah means. That is its genre, and how it is to be read.

There is no more striking example of this than the famous rabbinic comment with which Rashi begins his commentary to the Torah. 'Rabbi Yitzchak said: the Torah should have begun with the verse (Exodus 12:1), "This month shall be to you the first of months", which is the first of the commandments given to Israel.' Behind R. Yitzchak's remark is the assumption that the Torah is essentially a *book of commandments*: the constitution of the covenant between God and Israel. It should therefore have begun with the first command to the children of Israel. Evidently R. Yitzchak was prepared to contemplate a Torah which omitted entirely the narratives of creation, the flood, the patriarchs, the exile and the first stages of exodus. Thus far did one sage express his indifference to the factual information — historical and cosmological — contained in the Torah's first sixty-one chapters.

Nor, though R. Yitzchak's view is extreme, is it uncharacteristic. As many scholarly studies of Midrash have disclosed, the sages were remarkably indifferent to the historicity of Biblical narrative. They employed techniques of deliberate anachronism and what Yitzchak Heinemann calls 'creative historiography'. Their interest lay in deciphering every possible halakhic and ethical nuance of the text; not in laborious researches into its facticity. To have done otherwise would have been to have missed the point of the narrative and misconstrued its genre. Torah, as the Torah itself so often insists, is not an assemblage of facts: it is a set of rules and models of how Israel should live and be blessed. It does not set out primarily to answer the question, 'What happened?' but the question, 'How then shall I live?'

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To be sure, belief in Torah as revelation rules out the kind of critical approach advocated by Barr. It is important to see why. Consider one of Barr's examples: the Biblical account of creation. Barr's own view of the matter is this: 'About the actual processes of the origin of the world as we know them he [the putative human author of Genesis 1] knew, of course, nothing, and set against our knowledge of these processes his account is certainly "wrong"'. Since, on the other hand, the processes and sequences which are known to us through modern science were certainly totally unknown to him, this "wrongness" is quite irrelevant in our understanding the story.¹⁵

Now this is a very disingenuous comment. It makes *all* the difference as to whether we believe that Genesis 1 is a statement about creation by the Creator, or a naive pre-scientific account by a religiously inspired but cognitively primitive member of the species *homo sapiens*. It may be irrelevant to our understanding of the chapter, but it is critically relevant to our understanding of the world.

The believer in Torah as revelation is not naive. He may accept R. Ishmael's dictum that 'the Torah speaks in the language of man'.¹⁶ The Torah — as Maimonides emphasises — was revealed to a particular people at a particular time in specific historical, social and intellectual circumstances. It uses language and metaphor intelligible to one age: it may have to be decoded and re-encoded at another age. That is a major element of the process known as Midrash. But there is a vast difference between the idea that 'the Torah speaks in the language of man' and the idea that the Torah speaks with the voice of man. We believe it does not. It speaks with the voice of God.

It is here that the believer can and should turn the tables on the Bible critic. For the Torah does contain statements about its own purpose as a book. 'Moses commanded us the Torah as the heritage of the congregation of Jacob.'¹⁷ The Torah is firstly, *commanded*; it is a book in the imperative rather than the descriptive mode. Secondly, it is commanded to *us*, an enduring heritage; it is a book whose commanding force is not diminished over time. To read the Torah thus is to read it as it asks to be read. To read it otherwise may be an exercise in scholarship, but it is not to read it *as* Torah.

Biblical scholarship since the nineteenth century has been dominated by historicism. This emphasises 'the uniqueness of all historical phenomena' and maintains 'that each age should be interpreted in terms of its own ideas and principles'.¹⁸ It reads texts in the context of the past. It seeks their original meaning, not their present interpretation. It asks what a passage meant *then*, not what it might mean *now*.

That is how we read texts *academically*. Michael Fishbane has rightly noted that when read academically 'old texts are appreciated as alien to, or at least distanced from modern sensibilities and understandings — approachable only by crossing the philological-historical divide that separates their contents from our modern minds and intellectual habits'.¹⁹

But that is not how we read Torah *covenantally*. To read Torah publicly in the synagogue, to learn it in fulfilment of the command of *talmud Torah*, is to recreate Sinai. It is to hear Torah as spoken and promulgated *now*. It is to open oneself to the word of an Author whose intentionality is not governed by the normal laws of time and foreseeability. The 'Bible', read as the product of human minds long ago and somewhere else, ceases to be *Torah*, the word of God addressed to me, here, now. And what one must ask of the Bible scholar is: is his reading of the text any closer than that of the fundamentalist to the Torah as perceived by the community of faith? Does it read the book as it asks to be read and as it has been read since it was first accepted?

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There is a great deal more to be said about the narrow subject of 'fundamentalism' as a way of reading sacred texts, without yet touching on the social and political dimensions of the phenomenon. But I hope enough has been said to show that the use of a term drawn from the inner dynamic of Protestantism has only an obfuscating effect when transferred to Judaism. James Barr himself has scrupulously argued just this point; but it has generally been ignored by his Jewish borrowers.

The late Professor Leo Strauss, in his *Philosophy and Law*, made the very telling point that the Enlightenment, in its assault on religious traditions generally and Biblical faith specifically, never truly engaged with the concept of revelation. It merely took its non-existence as given, and proceeded to interpret the Bible accordingly, as if it had proved what in fact it had merely assumed. The traditional belief in revelation, meanwhile, was neither refuted nor refutable. 'For that reason, Orthodoxy, unchanged in its essence, was able to outlast the attack of the Enlightenment and all later attacks and retreats.'²⁰

The attention of Biblical scholarship has shifted dramatically in the last two decades, away from historicist methods toward the literary approaches of Robert Alter, Frank Kermode, Meir Weiss and Meir

Sternberg, structuralist readings inspired by Roland Barthes, and the 'canonical' approach of Professor Brevard Childs. Each of these stresses the unity of the text as opposed to its fragmentation through the methods of historical criticism. Childs' approach in particular attaches great weight to the text as understood by the faith community in which it is read.

In each of these new developments one senses a restlessness with the results of historical scholarship. Indeed Meir Sternberg, in his recent *Poetics of Biblical Narrative*, writes of the last two hundred years of Biblical research: 'Rarely has there been such a futile expense of spirit in a noble cause; rarely have such grandiose theories of origination been built and revised and pitted against one another on the evidential equivalent of the head of a pin; rarely have so many worked so long and so hard with so little to show for their trouble.'²¹

Fascinating though these developments may be to the believer, they are incidental to what I have called the covenantal reading of the text. The sages made a subtle and important distinction when they said: 'If you are told, There is wisdom [*chokhmah*] among the nations, believe it. If you are told there is Torah among the nations, do not believe it.' All post-Enlightenment scholarship proceeds on the axiom that its findings must be universally accessible and testable. That is its particular glory and what qualifies it for the title of *chokhmah*. Torah, however, proceeds on the assumption that its words and the living commentaries thereto are addressed to a specific community: the community to which Torah was given and by which it was accepted. That is what differentiates Torah from *chokhmah*, and *perush* – commentary and application – from research. Biblical scholarship may be *chokhmah* but it is not Torah. For only the community of the commanded can experience the Torah as command.

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The concept of *Torah min ha-shamayim*, Torah as revealed command, is a relational one. It presupposes One who commands, and those who are commanded. It embodies two ideas: the giving of the Torah and the receiving of the Torah. The giving of the Torah is – like creation, miracle and Divine intervention in history – a difficult idea. It speaks of the meeting of the Infinite and finite, the breakthrough of the transcendent into the world of the senses. Maimonides describes the revelation at Sinai as 'one of the mysteries of the Torah'. He adds: 'It is very difficult to have a true conception of the events, for there has never been before, nor will there ever be again, anything like it.'²²

This is not defensiveness on Maimonides' part. It flows from his, and our, concept of scientific knowledge. We can only generalise from the known to the unknown on the basis of observable regularities. Necessarily, therefore, unless we were witnesses, we cannot have empirical knowledge of unique events. The giving of the Torah was a unique event. Therefore we cannot know it empirically. Instead we can know it only through tradition and, ultimately, faith.

But if the giving of the Torah is a 'mystery', the receiving of the Torah is not. And here it is worth spelling out the hermeneutic implications of *Torah min ha-shamayim*.

To read Torah covenantally is to hear the voice of God who is above time and space addressing me in my full existential singularity. It is to enter into its words, not as they were addressed to the wilderness generation, but to me, here, now. It is to read the

awesome curses of Leviticus 26 and Deuteronomy 28 in full knowledge of the blood libels, the Crusades, the pogroms, the Inquisition, the expulsions, the *Shoah*. It is to read the promise of the ingathering in full knowledge of the state of Israel. It is to hear the infinite intentionality behind those words.

To read Torah covenantally is to be lifted on the wings of the Divine presence beyond the relativities of the human situation. It is to know that if there is a command in the Torah which we do not understand, that is a failure in our understanding which we must labour to overcome, not the mark of a human intrusion into the text which we must labour to emend. It is to recognise the sanctity of the Torah scroll, with which we dance on Simchat Torah, over which we mourn if it is defiled, which we bury if it is destroyed: the only object in Judaism which we recognise as animate, possessed of a soul.

To read Torah covenantally is to do so as part of the historic community of Israel, the 'congregation of Jacob' whose heritage it is. It is to hear its words filtered through the tradition of interpretation accepted as authoritative by the community of faith.

That is how Jews read Torah and how faith demands that Torah be read. As Torah. Which is to say: as authoritative instruction on how to live and how to interpret the meanings that underlie our experience of nature and history. This is not to rule out other readings, employing different methodologies, of those same words. But the words thus read are not Torah. They are words assigned to a different genre: a historical document, perhaps, or a literary text. Revelation defines the set of hermeneutic presuppositions that constitute recognition of the genre Torah. There is no reading of Torah which is not accompanied by faith.

If this is Fundamentalism, so be it. On it, I stake my faith as a Jew.

NOTES

1. Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking-Glass*, Ch. 6.
2. James Barr, *Fundamentalism*, London: SCM Press, 1977. See also his *Escaping from Fundamentalism*, London: SCM Press, 1984; and his *Holy Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
3. Jonathan Webber, 'Rethinking Fundamentalism: the Readjustment of Jewish Society in the Modern World,' in *Studies in Religious Fundamentalism*, edited by Lionel Caplan, London: Macmillan, 1987, 108.
4. Elliot Dorff and Arthur Rosett, *A Living Tree*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1988, 20.
5. M. T. *Yesodei ha-Torah* 7:7, 8:3.
6. Barr, *Fundamentalism*, 36.
7. M. T. *Teshuvah* 3:8.
8. M. T. *Teshuvah* 3:7.
9. *Guide of the Perplexed*, I, 36.
10. See *Guide of the Perplexed*, II, 42-46; Nachmanides, *Commentary* to Genesis 18:1.
11. *Guide of the Perplexed*, Introduction.
12. Barr, *Fundamentalism*, 49.
13. *Ibid.*, 50.
14. *Ibid.*, 93.
15. Barr, *Fundamentalism*, 42.
16. B. T. *Berakhot* 31b et al.
17. Deuteronomy 32:4.
18. *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, edited by Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, London: Fontana/Collins, 1983, 285-6.
19. Michael Fishbane, 'The Academy and the Community,' *Judaism* (Spring 1986), 153.
20. Leo Strauss, *Philosophy and Law*, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987, 11.
21. Meir Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, 13.
22. *Guide of the Perplexed*, II, 33. ■